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I. INTRODUCTION
Many courts hold that implicit in every insurance contract is a covenant of good
faith and fair dealing, the breach of which gives rise to a cause of action in tort.' By
employing tort concepts in these cases, courts have expanded the traditional rule
limiting damages for breach of contract to those arising naturally from the breach2
and have awarded to insureds extra-contractual damages far in excess not only of the
policy limits, but also of any damages flowing directly from any breach of contract.3
The implied covenant of good faith and fair dealing in insurance contracts is founded
on the belief that the primary objective of insurance coverage in this country is to
provide peace of mind and a sense of financial security to the insured.4 Because
policy holders whose claims are not handled in good faith may experience financial
ruin5 and severe emotional distress, 6 the insurance companies' refusal to resolve
claims against them in good faith clearly frustrates this purpose.
This implied covenant imposes two distinct duties on the insurance company:
the duty to settle and the duty to pay. A third party cause of action for failure to settle
arises when the insurer fails to act in good faith in settling a claim asserted by a third
party against the holder of a liability policy; the first party failure to pay action arises
1. E.g., Gruenberg v. Aetna Ins. Co., 9 Cal. 3d 566, 573, 510 P.2d 1032, 1037, 108 Cal. Rptr. 480, 485 (1973)
(insurer may not "unreasonably" withhold payments due under a policy); Grand Sheet Metal Prods. Co. v. Protection
Mut. Ins. Co., 34 Conn. Supp. 46, 52, 375 A.2d 428, 430 (1977) (noting in dicta that plaintiff need not show oppressive
behavior in order to prove bad faith); Amsden v. Grindel Mut. Reins. Co., 203 N.W.2d 252, 255 (Iowa 1972) (insured
must show "outrageous conduct" on the part of the insurer); Rova Farms Resort, Inc. v. Investors Ins. Co. of Am., 67
N.J. 474, 499, 323 A.2d 495, 508 (1974) (insurer must form its decision whether to settle "as though it alone were liable
for the entire risk"); Hoskins v. Aetna Life Ins. Co., 6 Ohio St. 3d 272, 277, 452 N.E.2d 1315, 1320 (1983) (insurer's
refusal to pay cannot be an "arbitrary or capricious one"). But see Vincent v. Blue Cross-Blue Shield, 373 So.2d 1054,
1056 (Ala. 1979) (refusing to recognize the tort action, or to award damages "for personal injury, inconvenience,
annoyance, or mental anguish and suffering" in a breach of insurance contract action); Kewin v. Massachusetts Mut. Life
Ins. Co., 409 Mich. 401,295 N.W.2d 50 (1980) (awarding of extra-contractual damages may be allowed in matters of life
and death, but is not allowed under disability insurance policies); Casenote, Insurance Law: Ohio Recognizes Tort Duty of
Good Faith and Fair Dealing betveen an Insurer and Its Insured-Hoskins v. Aetna Life Insurance Co., 6 Ohio St. 3d
272, 452 N.E.2d 1315 (1983), 10 U. DAYTO,4 L. REv. 159 (1984).
2. Hadley v. Baxendale, 156 Eng. Rep. 145, 9 Exch. 341 (1854).
3. In Fellows v. Allstate Ins. Co., No. C259993 (C.D. Super. Ct. Cal. 1983) for example, the California jury
awarded $40.5 million for the insurer's failure to pay a $36,000 claim on an uninsured motorist policy. These tort
damages hereinafter will be referred to as "extra-contractual" damages. They are not the same as consequential damages,
which may be awarded in contract actions, because the latter are limited to damages that are forseeable at the time the
contract is made; Hadley v. Baxendale, 156 Eng. Rep. 145, 9 Exch. 341 (1854); extra-contractual damages compensate
for all injuries that flow from the breach, whether or not such injuries could have been forseen when the contract was
made. Depending on the jurisdiction, extra-contractual awards may include compensation for pecuniary loss, for extreme
emotional distress, and punitive damages.
4. Note, Tort of Insurer's Bad Faith Refusal to Pay First-Party Claims, 82 W. VA. L. REv. 579, 579 (1980).
5. See, e.g., Hoskins v. Aetna Life Ins. Co., 6 Ohio St. 3d 272, 278, 452 N.E.2d 1315, 1322 (1983) (insureds
alleged that insurer's failure to pay forced the sale of their home to meet medical expenses); Hart v. Republic Mut. Ins.
Co., 152 Ohio St. 185, 186, 87 N.E.2d 347, 348 (1949) (insurer's failure to settle liability claim against insured resulted
in the impoundment and sale of insured's two trucks, his only means of supporting himself and his family).
6. See, e.g., Gruenberg v. Aetna Life Ins. Co., 9 Cal. 3d 566, 580, 510 P.2d 1032, 1041, 108 Cal. Rptr. 480, 489
(1973).
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when the insurer fails to act in good faith in handling and paying a claim asserted by
the insured under a non-liability policy. In the third party context, the relationship of
an insurance company to its insured is, by way of the company's status as the
insured's agent, "one of inherent fiduciary obligation." 7 When a claim arises against
the insured, the company almost always possesses the contractual right to control the
"investigation, negotiation, and settlement of any claim or suit as it deems ex-
pedient. "'8 Due to this fiduciary obligation, coupled with their sole control of the
litigation, insurance companies have been held liable in tort for damages in excess of
policy limits when they refused to accept the injured third party's offer to settle at or
below the policy limit or in excess of the policy limit by an amount "the insured is
willing and able to contribute." 9 For example: The insured holds with the insurer an
automobile liability policy that provides $100,000 in liability coverage. While driv-
ing, the insured tortiously causes injuries to a third party, who, during settlement
negotiations with the insurer, offers to settle the claim for $90,000. If the insurer,
hoping to escape with less or no liability, refuses to settle for that amount, which
would protect the insured from personal financial outlay, and at trial the third party
secures a judgment for $500,000, the insured may be able to recover the entire
amount from the insurer, even though the judgment exceeds the insurer's contractual
duty under the policy by $400,000. The gravamen of the third party failure to settle
cases is that an insurer that disregards a settlement offer at or near policy limits and
gambles on the outcome at trial does so with its own money, not the insured's.10
Some courts have adopted the tort action for breach of the covenant of good faith
and fair dealing from the failure to settle cases and have imposed a duty upon the
insurance company "to act in good faith and fairly in handling the claim of an
insured" 11 in the first party failure to pay setting, as well. When an insured asserts a
fraudulent claim or a claim for losses not covered by the policy, the insurer is clearly
under no duty to pay. The first party cause of action arises when the insurer fails to
pay a valid claim promptly and forces the insurer to bear the loss or seek redress
through compromise or litigation. An insurance company's determination not to pay
a legitimate claim may be predicated upon inadequate or improper investigation of
the claim,' 2 the insurer's belief that the claim is not covered based upon wrongful
behavior in selling, changing, or terminating the policy,t 3 or on the insurer's desire to
hold onto money concededly due the insured for as long as possible.' 4 The last of
these motivations to withhold payment of valid claims was especially attractive under
the traditional doctrine, which provided that even if the insured ultimately prevailed
7. Rova Farms Resort, Inc. v. Investors Ins. Co. of Am., 65 N.J. 474, 492, 323 A.2d 495, 505 (1974); see also
Gruenberg v. Aetna Life Ins. Co., 9 Cal. 3d 566, 582, 510 P.2d 1032, 1043, 108 Cal. Rptr. 480. 491 (1973).
8. Keeton, Liability Insurance and Responsibility for Settlement, 67 HARV. L. REv. 1136, 1137 (1954); see also
Gruenberg v. Aetna Life Ins. Co., 9 Cal. 3d 566, 510 P.2d 1032, 108 Cal. Rptr. 480 (1973).
9. Yeomans v. Allstate Ins. Co., 130 N.J. Super. 48, 324 A.2d 906, 908 (1974) (interpreting Rova Farms Resort.
Inc. v. Investors Ins. Co. of Am., 65 N.J. 474, 499, 323 A.2d 495, 508 (1974)).
10. Rova Farms Resort, Inc. v. Investors Ins. Co. of Am., 65 N.J. 474, 498, 323 A.2d 495, 508 (1974).
I1. E.g., Gruenberg v. Aetna Life Ins. Co., 9 Cal. 3d 566, 574, 510 P.2d 1032, 1037. 108 Cal. Rptr. 480, 485
(1973).
12. See infra text accompanying notes 72-86.
13. In such a case the court will rule that the loss is covered as a matter of law. See infra text accompanying note 87.
14. See infra note 15.
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at trial, his or her recovery was limited to contractual damages, which usually equal-
led the amount of payment due under the policy plus legal interest. 15
For example: An insured holds a health and accident insurance policy with the
insurer, and the insured is temporarily hospitalized, unable to run the small business
the insured owns. The insured files a legitimate claim with the insurer, but the insurer
refuses to pay the claim. As a result, the insured is unable to hire someone to run the
business during the insured's absence; the business folds, and the insured suffers
extreme emotional distress. If the insured then brought suit, under the traditional
contract cause of action, recovery would be limited to contractual damages. How-
ever, under the first party failure to pay tort cause of action, the insured may be able
to recover compensatory damages for pecuniary loss, emotional distress, and perhaps
punitive damages. Although first party actions deter wrongful failure to pay, it still
may enjoy vitality under certain circumstances.' 6 For example, an insurer, "[b]y
playing a 'waiting game' with a policyholder who is in dire financial straits following
an insured loss . . . may coerce the policyholder into settling for less than the full
benefits due him or her." 17
Although the third party failure to settle action and the first party failure to pay
action arise in different situations and create disparate duties upon the insurance
company, the nexus between them is the concept of good faith in expanding the
contours of the insurer's relationship to its insured. Unfortunately, the standard of
good faith has proven difficult to define and to apply.18 A viable alternative to the
good faith standard is a strict liability approach that would impute extra-contractual
liability to the insurer in the third party context when the insurer's failure to settle at
or below policy limits results in personal liability to the insured, and in the first party
context when the insurer's failure to pay a valid claim asserted against it results in
pecuniary and/or emotional injury to the insured. Courts applying the strict liability
approach no longer would consider whether the liability insurer has a good faith
belief that the insured is not liable or that the third party's damages are less than the
amount of the offer of settlement, or whether the nonliability insurer has a good faith
belief that the claim is fraudulent or otherwise not covered.
The thrust of this Comment is two-fold. First, it will examine the scope of the
insurer's duty to settle and to pay under the present good faith standard and will
explore the strategies and tactics to be employed by plaintiff's counsel in maintaining
these actions and by defense counsel in preventing and defending against them.
Second, this Comment will propose a strict liability approach to failure to settle and
failure to pay actions that would be simpler and more equitable than the present
standards.
15. The legal interest rate in Ohio, for example, is ten percent per annum. OHio REv. CODE ANN. § 1343.03 (Page
Supp. 1983). Therefore, prior to the recognition of the first party failure to pay action, the insurer could invest the amount
due to the insured at a rate greater than 10% and benefit from its wrongdoing if its attorney fees for any contract action did
not exceed the interest on the amount due to the insured.
16. If the insurer believes that the insured will not seek legal redress or that the insured will not be able to accomplish
the difficult task of proving bad faith, then the insurer might try to withhold payment.
17. Note, supra note 4.
18. See, e.g., Komblum, Using the Claim Expert in Extra-Contract Actions Against Insurers, 51 INS. COUNSEL J.
185, 185 (1984).
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II. THE DUTY OF GOOD FAITH AND FAIR DEALING
A. The Third Party Failure to Settle Action
1. The Standard for Liability
"As early as 1882, the judiciary recognized the disparity of knowledge, eco-
nomic resources, and bargaining power that existed between the insurer and the
insured, and held that the nature of the insurance contract necessitated mutual confi-
dence and a spirit of good faith and fair dealing."' 19 Early cases emphasized the
"correlative ' 20 obligations of both the insurer and the insured 2' under the insurance
contract. In Hart v. Republic Mutual Insurance Co.,22 the Ohio Supreme Court held
that the insurer's refusal of several settlement offers within the policy limit2' coupled
with delay tactics perpetrated by the company's president 24 established a prima facie
case of bad faith. The court also recognized the insured's right to recover damages in
excess of the policy limit when the insurer's failure to settle was fraudulent or in bad
faith. 25
However, the Ohio courts have held consistently that
the mere fact that an insurer refuses to settle within policy limits is not, in itself, conclu-
sive of the insurer's bad faith and does not give rise to tort liability. In order to recover for
the excess liability, the insured has the burden to show that the refusal to settle was not
made in good faith.
26
Confined to this rule, the Ohio courts have had considerable difficulty in defining the
parameters of "good faith" and "bad faith. "27 In Slater v. Mutual Insurance Co.,28
the Ohio Supreme Court said that "'[b]ad faith' is a general and somewhat indefinite
term. It has no constricted meaning. It cannot be defined with exactness." 29 Ul-
timately, the court resolved the issue in the following language:
[a] lack of good faith is the equivalent of bad faith, and bad faith, although not susceptible
of concrete definition, embraces more than bad judgment or negligence. It imports a
dishonest purpose, moral obliquity, conscious wrongdoing, breach of a known duty
through some ulterior motive or ill will partaking of the nature of fraud. It also embraces
actual intent to mislead or deceive another.30
19. Comment, The Emerging Fiduciary Obligations and Strict Liability in Insurance Law, 14 CAL. W.L. REV. 358,
358 (1978).
20. Brassil v. Maryland Casualty Co., 210 N.Y. 235, 242, 104 N.E. 622, 624 (1914).
21. For an interesting analysis of the insured's duty of good faith, see Note, Insurance Settlements: An Insured's Bad
Faith, 31 DRAKE L. REv. 877 (1981-82).
22. 152 Ohio St. 185, 87 N.E.2d 347 (1949).
23. Id. at 188, 87 N.E.2d at 349.
24. Id. at 189, 87 N.E.2d at 350.
25. Id. at 188, 87 N.E.2d at 349.
26. Hoskins v. Aetna Life Ins. Co., 6 Ohio St. 3d 272, 276, 452 N.E.2d 1315, 1320 (1983).
27. Although these cases use the terms "bad faith" and "lack of good faith" interchangeably, see infra text
accompanying note 29, the burden upon the insured is arguably less under the latter. See Timmons v. Royal Globe Ins.
Co., 53 OKLA. B.J. 1898, 1902 (1982) (shifting the emphasis from bad faith to breach of the duty to deal in good faith).
28. 174 Ohio St. 148, 187 N.E.2d 45 (1962).
29. Id. at 151, 187 N.E.2d at 48 (1962) (quoting Spiegel v. Beacon Participations, Inc., 297 Mass. 398, 416, 8
N.E.2d 895, 907 (1937)).
30. Slater v. Motorists Mut. Ins. Co., 174 Ohio St. 148, 148, 187 N.E.2d 45, 45 (1962).
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Under this standard, the Slater court ruled that the insurer's failure to officially
disclose the policy limits to opposing counsel did not constitute bad faith "although it
may have been arbitrary and a display of bad judgment by the insurer."'" More
recently, the Ohio Supreme Court has ruled that the primary insurer's requests for
contribution from an excess insurer before exhausting policy limits does not give rise
to bad faith per se. 2 Likewise, the duty of good faith does not require the insurer to
offer the full policy limit during negotiations, even though the injured third party
demands damages far in excess of the policy. 33 Aggrieved insureds have had con-
siderable difficulty proving the dishonest purpose, moral obliquity, or conscious
wrongdoing necessary to establish bad faith under the Ohio rule. 34
Although no court has expressly adopted the strict liability approach,35 many
jurisdictions have enunciated a standard of damages in third party actions that is more
favorable to the aggrieved insured than Ohio's definition of bad faith. In California,
recovery of damages in excess of the policy limits "may be based on unwarranted
rejection of a reasonable settlement offer and ... the absence of evidence, circum-
stantial or direct, showing actual dishonesty, fraud, or concealment is not fatal to the
cause of action. ' 3 6 Under the California rule the mere showing that the insurer's
failure to settle was negligent is sufficient to establish a case for extra-contract
damages.3 7 Two commentators have noted that
the difference between 'bad faith' and 'negligence' has become more of a difference in
wording than in results. The two tests have tended to coalesce, so that even those courts
that reject the negligence test and apply exclusively the test of good faith nonetheless
consider the insurer's negligence relevant in determining whether the insurer exercised the
requisite good faith.
3 8
2. Scope of the Duty
The insurer's duties under the good faith standard have been defined by case law
and to some extent by statute. 39 Once the insured proves that the insurer refused to
accept an injured third party's offer of settlement at or below policy limits, n" some
31. Id. at 152, 187 N.E.2d at 48. However, the court also noted that opposing counsel was well aware of the policy
limits, since the insurer's agent had unofficially disclosed this information. Id.
32. Centennial Ins. Co. v. Liberty Mut. Ins. Co., 62 Ohio St. 2d 221, 225, 404 N.E.2d 759, 763 (1980) (applying
the good faith standard to a case involving the subrogation of an excess insurer).
33. Id. at 224-25, 404 N.E.2d at 762-63. In this wrongful death case the insurer's final offer before impasse was
$250,000 and the third party's final offer of settlement was $275,000. The policy limit was $300,000, which was more
than a half million dollars less than the plaintiff's prayer in her complaint.
34. See, e.g., McDowell-Wellman Eng'g. Co. v. Hartford Accident & Indem. Co., 711 F.2d 521, 527-28 (3d Cir.
1983) (applying Ohio law).
35. But see Rova Farms Resort, Inc. v. Investors Ins. Co. of Am., 65 N.J. 474, 500, 323 A.2d 495, 509 (1974)
(positing that "one day, in an appropriate issue" that court might impose liability for a refusal to settle without a showing
of bad faith).
36. Crisei v. Security Ins. Co., 66 Cal. 2d 425, 430, 426 P.2d 173, 177, 58 Cal. Rptr. 13, 17 (1967).
37. See Anderson v. St. Paal Mercury Indem. Co., 340 F.2d 406, 409 (7th Cir. 1965) (interpreting Indiana law);
Cemocky v. Indem. Ins. Co. of Am., 69 I11. App. 2d 196, 205,216 N.E.2d 198,203 (1966) (imposing a dual standard on
the insurer to avoid acting negligently or in bad faith).
38. Harison & Langerman, Actions Against Insurerfor Bad Faith Failure to Settle Claim, 21 Am. JUR. TRIALS 229,
239 (1974).
39. See, e.g., Royal Globe Ins. Co. v. Superior Court, 23 Cal. 3d 880, 592 P.2d 329, 153 Cal. Rptr. 842 (1979)
(interpreting California's Unfair Practices Act); see also CAL. INS. CODE § 790.03(h) (West Supp. 1984) (imposing
certain duties upon the liability insurer).
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further proof of the insurer's breach of its good faith duty is required for the insured to
collect tort damages. The requisite quantum of proof depends upon the good faith
standard in force in the particular jurisdiction. Generally, when the insurer receives
notice that an injured third party has filed a claim against the insured demanding
damages in excess of the policy limit, the law imposes several duties upon the
insurer.4 ' The insurer's breach of a particular duty, even when coupled with the
failure to settle within policy limits, will not automatically amount to bad faith.
Rather, the court will consider the breach only one "of the several factors to be
evaluated in the light of all the circumstances surrounding the rejection of the com-
promise offer." 4 2 This Comment will examine some of these duties and assess the
weight that their breach will have upon the determination of bad faith.
a. The Duty to Communicate
Many of the insurer's duties may be categorized under the rubric of the duty of
communication. "As a minimum, the insurer is obligated to inform the insured
concerning settlement proposals within the policy limits." 43 In order to put teeth into
this requirement, the notice of the settlement offer must be "timely and
meaningful."' In Herges v. Western Casualty and Surety Co.,45 the Eighth Circuit
ruled that the insurer erred in waiting until the morning of a wrongful death trial to
communicate the offer to the insured, but that failure to inform did not, standing by
itself, constitute bad faith.46
Concomitant with the duty to disclose settlement offers, the insurer often is
required to communicate to its insured the "results of any investigation indicating
liability in excess of policy limits, and any offers of settlement which were made, so
that [the insured] might take proper steps to protect his own interests," 47 and to
explain these matters thoroughly if the insured cannot determine how to protect
himself due to "his limited ability to comprehend.' 48
A duty of disclosure also may exist with regard to the insurance company's
communications to the third party claimant. In Coppage v. Fireman's Fund In-
surance Co. ,' the injured third party, who was aware of the insured's acute financial
distress resulting from the automobile accident in question, voiced a desire to settle
40. The insured alternatively may prove that the rejected offer was in excess of the policy limit by an amount the
insured was willing and able to contribute. See supra note 9 and accompanying text. For simplicity, this Comment
implicitly includes that situation into the term "at or below policy limits."
41. These duties may arise when the demand is less than the policy limits if the jurisdiction allows verdicts in excess
of the ad damnum. Harrison & Langerman, supra note 38, at 268. Under FFD. R. Civ. P. 54(c), a judgment other than a
default judgment may exceed the amount sought in plaintiff's complaint.
42. Younger v. Lumberman's Mut. Casualty Co., 174 So. 2d 672, 679 (La. Ct. App.), cert. denied, 247 La. 1086,
176 So. 2d 145 (1965) (dealing with the duty to inform insured of settlement offers).
43. Harrison & Langerman, supra note 38, at 279.
44. Herges v. Western Casualty & Sur. Co., 408 F.2d 1157, 1162 (8th Cir. 1969).
45. Id.
46. Id.
47. Martin v. Hartford Accident and Indem. Co., 228 Cal. App. 2d 178, 184, 39 Cal. Rptr. 342, 346 (1964).
48. Kinder v. western Pioneer Ins. Co., 231 Cal. App. 2d 894, 901,42 Cal. Rptr. 394, 398 (1965). The insured was
"a man of below average intelligence" according to the claims manager. Id. at 898, 42 Cal. Rptr. at 396.
49. 379 F.2d 621 (6th Cir. 1967).
[Vol. 46:157
FROM GOOD FAITH TO STRICT LIABILITY
within the policy limits.50 Subsequently, the insurer offered to settle for $5,000 but
failed to inform the claimant that the offer constituted the policy limits. The third
party, believing the policy limits to be higher, rejected the offer.5 1 The court held that
the insurer's failure to disclose the policy limits in this situation "was a circumstance
which the jury could consider on the question of bad faith," although the court
refused to acknowledge "a general duty to disclose policy limits to a claimant.' '52
Thus, an insurer's failure to disclose matters to a third party may breach the insurer's
duty to the insured if this failure to communicate increases the insured's liability.
b. The Duty to Evaluate
The duty to evaluate claims encompasses the insurer's duty to investigate53 and
some of the insured's other responsibilities as the fiduciary of the insured. Some
courts have characterized the duty as "not absolute but . . . one of 'due diligence
and good faith.' "14 Two aspects of the insurer's evaluation are the determination of
the likelihood that liability will be imposed upon the insured and the extent of
potential damages. Ascertaining the probability of an imposition of liability at trial is
the more vexing dilemma; the proper standard to which the insurer ought to be held
has stirred considerable litigation. Clearly the insurer, no matter how extensive its
efforts, can never determine to a certainty whether liability will be imposed if the case
goes to trial. Regarding the determination of potential damages, "to avoid a finding
of bad faith, the insurer may be required to make repeated monetary evaluations of
the case with each material development; the fact that it made a good faith evaluation
at an early stage of the case may not excuse it." 55 In finding bad faith in negligent
evaluation of potential liability, the California courts have held that
[t]he size of the judgment recovered in the personal injury action when it exceeds policy
limits, although not conclusive, furnishes an inference that the value of the claim is the
equivalent of the amount of the judgment and that acceptance of an offer within those
limits was the most reasonable method of dealing with the claim.5 6
Since an insurer is not automatically held liable for any judgment against the insured
that exceeds policy limits, the central issue of the evaluation duty is the extent to
which the insurer must consider the insured's interests and the extent to which the
insurer may consider its own. The consensus is that the insurance company "may, of
course, properly consider its own interest, but it may never, never forget that of its
Assured.' '57 The California test "[i]n determining whether an insurer has given
consideration to the interests of the insured . . . is whether a prudent insurer without
50. Id. at 624.
51. Id.
52. Id. at 624 n.3.
53. This duty is similar to the nonliability insurer's duty. See infra text accompanying notes 72-86.
54. State Farm Auto. Ins. Co. v. Brewer, 406 F.2d 610, 612 (9th Cir. 1968) (quoting Kuzmanich v. United Fire &
Casualty Co., 242 Or. 529, 532, 410 P.2d 812, 813 (1966)).
55. Harrison & Langerman, supra note 38, at 284-85.
56. Crisci v. Security Ins. Co., 66 Cal. 2d 425, 431, 426 P.2d 173, 177, 58 Cal. Rptr. 13, 17 (1967).
57. Smoot v. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co., 299 F.2d 525, 532 (5th Cir. 1962).
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policy limits would have accepted the settlement offer. '58 Other courts have held that
the insurer must give at least equal attention to the insured's interests as it does to its
own.5 9 Thus, even though the insurer is the insured's fiduciary in settling third party
claims, it may in some instances equate its own interest with the insured's.
c. The Duty to Negotiate
Finally, the insurer has dual negotiation responsiblities concerning its efforts to
settle with the injured third party and to seek contribution from the insured. At a
minimum, the insurer must demonstrate a willingness to enter into negotiations with
the third party claimant. A failure to do so coupled with a verdict in excess of policy
limits may be sufficient to establish bad faith. In Abernethy v. Utica Mutual In-
surance Co.,6' the Fourth Circuit stated that "the flat refusal to negotiate, under the
circumstances of substantial exposure to liability, a demonstrated receptive climate
for settlement and limited insurance coverage, could have been found to show lack of
good faith in [the insurer]'s exercise of its exclusive power to settle."
6
'
In order to avoid extra-contractual liability for failure to settle, the insurer may
ask the insured to contribute funds to the settlement. In Ohio, the insurer may make
such a request before it has exhausted its policy limits. 62 Other courts require the
insurer to offer the full policy limits before asking the insured to contribute. 63 The
question remains whether an insurer who has offered the policy limit is required to
seek contribution from the insured in excess of that amount in order to settle below a
potential damage award. The majority rule seems to be that the "failure of the insurer
to attempt to induce contribution by the insured '64 is a factor to consider, but is not
by itself determinative of bad faith.
65
3. Unfairness of the Present Rule
The well-settled law concerning the liability insurer's duty of good faith in
settling third party claims against its insured demonstrates that in many situations the
insurer may expose the insured to great losses in excess of policy limits without
breaching the duty of good faith and fair dealing. If the insured denies liability or
requests the insurer not to accept a settlement offer within the policy limit, 66 saddling
58. Crisci v. Security Ins. Co., 66 Cal. 2d 425, 429, 426 P.2d 173, 176, 58 Cal. Rptr. 13, 16 (1967).
59. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co. v. Brewer, 406 F.2d 610, 612 (9th Cir. 1968) (quoting Radcliffe v. Franklin
Nat'l Ins. Co., 208 Or. 1, 47, 298 P.2d 1002, 1023 (1956)).
60. 373 F.2d 565 (4th Cir. 1967).
61. Id. at 570.
62. Centennial Ins. Co. v. Liberty Mut. Ins. Co., 62 Ohio St. 2d 221, 225, 404 N.E.2d 759, 763 (1980) (dealing
with the request to an excess insurer).
63. See, e.g., Boling v. New Amsterdam Casualty Co., 173 Okla. 160, 46 P.2d 916 (1935) (a post-judgment
settlement offer in excess of the policy limits by an amount insured was willing to contribute refused by insurer).
64. Young v. American Casualty Co., 416 F.2d 906, 910 (2d Cir. 1969), cer. dismissed, 396 U.S. 997 (1970).
65. Id.
66. An insured, fully aware of the potential exposure to liability from an adverse judgment, nonetheless may refuse
to settle for a myriad of reasons. A physician or other professional may not wish to settle a malpractice suit because
settlement will appear to be a tacit acknowledgement of fault, bringing into question that person's skills and perhaps
hurting business. Other insureds, such as manufacturers, may refuse to settle product liability suits because settlement
would encourage others to bring similar suits.
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the insured with any extra-contractual damages granted at trial is clearly equitable.
Even if a strict liability standard were imposed, the insured's consent should con-
stitute a defense in a failure to settle action. However, in many other circumstances,
the insured may prove the insurer's refusal to accept an offer of compromise within
policy limits and even the breach of other duties placed on the insurer, but the insurer
may still not be liable for extra-contractual damages under the present system. In light
of the insurer's control of the negotiation process, such a result is clearly unfair.
B. The First Party Failure to Pay Action
The first party action is of more recent vintage than the third party action, 67 and
some jurisdictions that recognize the insured's right to sue for the insurer's failure to
settle thus far have refused to recognize the failure to pay tort action. 68 In refusing to
extend the implied covenant of good faith and fair dealing to the first party context,
the Supreme Court of Florida reasoned that the insurer and its insured "occupy a
contractually adversary position toward each other,' '69 and ruled that "[t]he penalty
imposed by [Florida] law on the insurer for its failure to [pay] the claim of the insured
within a reasonable time is [limited to] the payment of interest at the legal rate.' 70
Deeming the legal relationship between insurer and insured as that of debtor and
creditor rather than as fiduciary and beneficiary, the court concluded that:
It would be a strange quirk in the law to hold that each time a debtor fails or refuses to pay
demands made upon it by a creditor, the debtor would be liable for both compensatory and
punitive damages even though his failure or refusal was motivated by spite, malice, or bad
faith. 71
I. The Standard
The Ohio Supreme Court recently joined the growing ranks of courts recogniz-
ing the first party failure to pay tort action in Hoskins v. Aetna Life Insurance Co. 72 In
Hoskins, the court determined that an insured could recover extra-contractual dam-
ages, including punitive damages 73 if the insurer acted with actual malice in breach-
ing its "duty to act in good faith in handling and payment of the claims of its
insured." 74 The Franklin County Court of Common Pleas previously had allowed
recovery of punitive damages for the breach of a nonliability insurance contract in
Kirk v. Safeco Insurance Co. 75 The Kirk court found that the insurer failed to
negotiate with the insureds on the value of their lost household effects and clothing
and that the insurer's settlement offer was founded upon "no reasonable basis
67. The first case allowing the first party action was Gruenberg v. Aetna Ins. Co., 9 Cal. 3d 566, 510 P.2d 1032,
108 Cal. Rptr. 480 (1973).
68. See, eg., Baxter v, Royal Indem. Co., 285 So. 2d 652 (Fla. 1973) (uninsured motorist policy).
69. Id. at 656.
70. Id. at 657.
71. Id.
72. 6 Ohio St. 3d 272, 452 N.E.2d 1315 (1983).
73. Id. at 272, 452 N.E.2d at 1317.
74. Id. at 272, 452 N.E.2d at 1316.
75. 28 Ohio Misc. 44, 273 N.E.2d 919 (C.P. Franklin County 1970).
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whatsoever."- 76 These acts, together with the insurer's general malice, constituted a
breach of contract that "amount[ed] to a willful, wanton and malicious tort," which
justified punitive damages.77
In recognizing the first party cause of action, the Hoskins court reiterated the
standard enunciated in Ohio's third party failure to settle actions and noted that mere
failure to pay a valid claim or negligence in processing a claim does not give rise to
insurer tort liability per se.7 8 The court restricted the insured's recovery of punitive
damages to situations in which the insured could prove that the insurer acted with
actual malice, actual malice being defined as "'that state of mind under which a
person's conduct is characterized by hatred or ill will, a spirit of revenge, retaliation,
or a determination to vent his feelings upon other persons.'" 79 The plaintiff has the
burden of showing actual malice "[b]ased on the information available to [the in-
surer]. "80 In Hoskins, the insured was transferred from a general wing of a hospital to
its skilled nursing unit, to facilitate physical therapy involving a large and relatively
immobile tilt table. In spite of the insured's demands, the insurance company refused
to pay for the insured's medical expenses while in the skilled nursing unit. Although
the insured's health insurance policy limit had not been reached, the company in-
sisted that the unit was a "convalescent facility," which was not covered under the
policy. 8' Despite evidence that more vigorous investigation of the claim would have
shown that the skilled nursing unit was not distinct from the hospital and thus was
covered by the policy, the court denied the plaintiffs' punitive damages claim, 82
stating "that the complaint does not allege nor does the record show that there was
any affirmative action on the part of the insurer as would support a claim for punitive
damages.' 83
The Ohio rule, as articulated in Hoskins, seems to be that a first party tort action
cannot be founded upon the insurer's nonfeasance, or lack of action, but only upon its
malfeasance, or improper action, and that the insured can recover punitive damages
only if the insurer was motivated by actual malice.8 4 Nonfeasance is sufficient to
establish a prima facie case for breach of contract, but in the absence of a duty to act,
only malfeasance can sound a case in tort.85 In Ohio, therefore, an insurer who
conducts no investigation whatsoever (nonfeasance) may arguably, under the rule of
Hoskins, avoid a punitive damages judgment. The Hoskins decision therefore may
76. Id. at 46, 273 N.E.2d at 921.
77. Id.
78. Hoskins v. Aetna Life Ins. Co., 6 Ohio St. 3d 273, 277, 452 N.E.2d 1315, 1320 (1983).
79. Id. (Quoting Columbus Fin. v. Howard, 42 Ohio St. 2d 178, 183-84, 327 N.E.2d 654, 658 (1975)).
80. Hoskins v. Aetna Life Ins. Co., 6 Ohio St. 3d 273, 278, 452 N.E.2d 1315, 1321 (1983).
81. Id. at 273, 452 N.E.2d at 1317.
82. Id. at 278, 452 N.E.2d at 1321. The plaintiffs were awarded $20,792.91 on their breach of contract claim.
83. Id. at 279, 452 N.E.2d at 1322.
84. Notwithstanding the court's pronouncement that nonfeasance is insufficient to establish a tort case for punitive
damages, the Hoskins court relies on the fact that the insurer "did not blindly ignore [insured's] position." Id. Therefore,
the court may consider an insurer's gross neglect of a claim sufficient to establish actual malice and justify an award of
punitive damages in a future case.
85. See W. PROSSER, HANDBOOK OF THE LAW OF TORTS 614 (4th ed. 1971).
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encourage an insurer to take no action rather than to investigate a claim and risk a tort
action for improper investigation (malfeasance).8 6
While Ohio predicates the recovery of punitive damages upon a tortious breach
of the implied covenant of good faith and fair dealing, coupled with actual malice,
other jurisdictions justify the award on other theories such as "fraud by the insurer in
dealing with the insured at both the sales and claims levels, the intentional infliction
of emotional distress, the invasion of a protected property interest, and violation of a
statute."
87
The California Supreme Court was the first court to recognize the first party
cause of action. In Gruenberg v. Aetna Insurance Co.,88 the insured brought an
action against the insurance company for failure to pay under a fire insurance
policy. 89 Reasoning that the duty to settle and the duty to pay "are merely two
different aspects of the same duty," 90 the court applied the standard applicable in
third party actions in California, "namely a duty not to withhold unreasonable pay-
ments due under a policy." 9 One commentator suggested that the distinction be-
tween the failure to settle and failure to pay actions is more formalistic than sub-
stantive. 92 "In both cases the insurer has contracted to protect the insured against
loss. In both cases it has control over settlement of claims .... It should be liable for
all loss resulting from its bad faith, whether the loss to the insured occurs from legal
liability or otherwise." 93 The California courts also have allowed the insured or the
insured's direct beneficiary to take action against the insurer for unreasonably with-
86. The Ohio Supreme Court recently extended the "duty to act in good faith in the handling and payment of
claims" to the issuer of a financial responsibility bond. Suver v. Personal Serv. Ins. Co., 11 Ohio St. 3d 6, 462 N.E.2d
415 (1984). The court noted "that a financial responsibility bond is not the same as an insurance policy," but reasoned
that the
differences are not so pronounced as to require the creation of a cause of action in one case and its denial in the
other, Precisely the same policy arguments and rationale hold true in both settings. In both cases there is a great
disparity of financial resources. Additionally, issuers of financial responsibility bonds are companies clearly
affected with a public interest. Moreover, to insulate the issuer of a financial responsibility bond from liability
for the deliberate refusal to pay its obligations arising from the bond is to encourage the routine denial of
payment of claims for as long as possible. This court should not provide an incentive to act in bad faith.
Id. at 8-9. 462 N.E.2d at 417.
In his dissent, Justice Holmes distinguished Hoskins, saying that in that case
the imposition of the duty of good faith upon the insurer was justified because of the relationship between the
insurer and the insured. There was obviously privity of contract and consideration flowing from both sides. In
my view, the contractual relationship between the parties was vital in establishing the duty on the insurer to act
in good faith. I fail to see any relationship between the parties herein which was so vital to the Hoskins decision.
Id. at 9-10, 462 N.E.2d at 418 (Holmes, J., dissenting).
This extension of the good faith doctrine should have far reaching implications in light of the recently strengthened
requirements concerning the financial responsibility of Ohio drivers. See OHio Rv. CODE ANN. § 4507.212 (Page Supp.
1984).
87. Kornblum, Defense of a First-Party Extra-Contract Claims Action Against A Life, Health andAccident Insurer,
29 Am. Jim. TRIALS 481, 493 (1982).
88. 9 Cal. 3d 566, 510 P.2d 1032, 108 Cal. Rptr. 480 (1973).
89. Id. at 570, 510 P.2d at 1034, 108 Cal. Rptr. at 482.
90. Id. at 573, 510 P.2d at 1037, 108 Cal. Rptr. at 485.
91. Id.
92. Note, supra note 4, at 583.
93. Note, The Availability of Excess Damages for Wrongful Refusal to Honor First Party Insurance Claims-An
Emerging Trend, 45 FORDHAM L. REv. 164, 178 n.99 (1976).
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holding payment under a health insurance policy, 94 under the uninsured motorist
provision of an automobile policy 95 and under a disability insurance policy.
96
Although California adheres to a negligence standard, 97 the climate in that state is
perhaps most favorable to a strict liability approach. Indeed, one federal court in-
terpreting California law adopted a rule resembling such a standard. In McDowell v.
Union Mutual Life Insurance Co.,98 the court disregarded the reasonableness stan-
dard and declared that "[tihe lesson of the line of cases in California is that insurance
companies that erroneously withhold payments from their insureds, and deprive them
of the security they bargained for, must be held to account for the consequences of
their conduct."- 99
Some of the other jurisdictions that recognize the first party cause of action also
have anchored the insured's right to recovery upon a reasonableness standard. In
Wisconsin, for example, "[t]o show a claim for bad faith, a plaintiff must show the
absence of a reasonable basis for denying benefits of the policy."'' 10 However, the
Wisconsin Supreme Court characterizes the tort of bad faith as an intentional one, and
requires the insured to show "the defendant's knowledge or reckless disregard of the
lack of a reasonable basis for denying the claim."'' Whereas in California, an
insurer that fails to pay a valid claim because it negligently investigates or otherwise
handles the claim is liable for extra-contractual damages, 0 2 in Wisconsin, the plain-
tiffs mere showing of negligence would be insufficient to impose such damages upon
the insurer. 10
3
The Supreme Court of Alabama has further restricted the opportunities for
recovery under the first party cause of action. In order to prevail in that state, a
plaintiff must show not only an intentional refusal to pay the insured's claim, but also
"the absence of any reasonably legitimate or arguable reason'104 for withholding
payment of a claim. Under this standard, the plaintiff's prima facie case must include
a showing "that the insurance company had no legal or factual defense to the in-
surance claim. 105 This imposes a considerable burden upon the insured. Applying
this rule, in National Savings Life Insurance Co. v. Dutton,10 6 the court said
"[w]hether an insurance company is justified in denying a claim under a policy must
be judged by what was before it at the time the decision is made. . . . We cannot
agree with the plaintiffs assertion that the company had an affirmative duty to
investigate further." 0 7 In Dutton, the insurance company refused to pay the plaintiff
under a health insurance policy because she erroneously answered in her insurance
94. Silberg v. California Life Ins. Co., 11 Cal. 3d 452, 521 P.2d 1103, 113 Cal. Rptr. 711 (1974).
95. Richardson v. Employers Liab. Assurance Corp., 25 Cal. App. 3d 232, 102 Cal. Rptr. 547 (1972).
96. Fletcher v. Western Nat'l Life Ins. Co., 10 Cal. App. 3d 376, 89 Cal. Rptr. 78 (1970).
97. See id.
98. 404 F. Supp. 136 (C.D. Cal. 1975).
99. Id. at 141.
100. Anderson v. Continental Ins. Co., 85 Wis. 2d 675, 691, 271 N.W.2d 368, 376 (1978).
101. Id.
102. Gruenberg v. Aetna Ins. Co., 9 Cal. 3d 566, 510 P.2d 1032, 108 Cal. Rptr. 480 (1975).
103. See Anderson v. Continental Ins. Co., 85 Wis. 2d 675, 271 N.W.2d 368 (1978).
104. National Sec. Fire & Casualty Co. v. Bowen, 417 So. 2d 179, 183 (Ala. 1982).
105. Id.
106. 419 So. 2d 1357 (Ala. 1982).
107. Id. at 1362.
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policy application that she had no heart or circulatory problems, even though hospital
records available to but not examined by the insurance company subsequently show-
ed the existence of chest pains. '0 8 The court held this failure to investigate thoroughly
insufficient to sustain plaintiffs claim for excess damages, although in California the
facts probably would have been sufficient to establish the plaintiffs prima facie case
in a first party action.'
0 9
2. Scope of the Duty
Once the insured has proven that the claim which the insurer refused to pay was
valid, the insured also must prove the breach of a specific duty according to the
applicable standard in the particular jurisdiction. These duties relate to the insurer's
behavior in handling the claim.
a. The Duty to Investigate
To reach an informed decision whether an insured's claim is valid, the insurance
company must investigate the claim or hire an outside investigator. The investigative
procedure is of great importance to the insured because the results will determine
whether the insured will be paid or will have to resort to litigation or compromise.
Three pertinent aspects of the duty to investigate are: requirements regarding the
insurer's methods of gathering information, requirements regarding the quantity of
information to be gathered, and requirements regarding the handling of this informa-
tion.
Currently in Ohio, the only clear investigative duty upon the insurer is based
upon a statutory prohibition of pattern settlements."10 As defined by the statute, a
pattern settlement is "a method by which liability is routinely imputed to a claimant
without an investigation of the particular occurrence upon which the claim is based
and by using a predetermined formula for the assignment of liability arising out of
occurrences of a similar nature."1. The insurer must investigate the particular occur-
rence that caused the injury and the particular injuries suffered. In California, on the
other hand, the duty to gather information also includes the insurer's prompt in-
vestigation of the insurability of the insured. " 2
Cases dealing with the compilation of medical records are helpful in determining
the amount of information the insurer is required to amass. In Alabama, the insurer
has the duty to question the insured to see if the insurer's information is consistent
with the insured's articulation of the injuries, but if upon inquiry the insured does not
refute the insurer's information, the insurer may rely upon that information without
108. Id. at 1358-61.
109. Cf. McLaughlin v. Connecticut Gen. Life Ins. Co., 565 F. Supp. 434, 454 (N.D. Cal. 1983); Egan v. Mut'l of
Omaha, 24 Cal. 3d 809, 620 P.2d 141, 169 Cal. Rptr. 691 (1979).
110. OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 3901.21 (Page Supp. 1983).
111. Id.
112. Barrera v. State Farm Mut'l Auto. Ins. Co., 71 Cal. 2d 659, 663, 456 P.2d 674, 677, 79 Cal. Rptr. 106, 109
(1969) (automobile liability insurer).
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doing more.11 3 The California courts require more sensitivity to the nature of the
claim and circumstances surrounding the investigation. For example, the insurer's
investigation must be more thorough before terminating disability payments, "partic-
ularly when the insurer knows... that... its insured had recently undergone sur-
gery." 1
14
Finally, the insurer may have certain responsibilities regarding the dissemination
of information it has gathered. In Little v. Stuyvesant Life Insurance Co.,115 the
California Court of Appeal ruled that the insured could recover punitive damages
based upon its finding that the insurer "purposely ignored the great bulk of the
medical information it had and withheld that information from the physicians it
selected to examine plaintiff." 116 Stuyvesant demonstrates that the insurer, in its
investigation of the validity of medical claims, must provide its doctors with all
available medical information; the insurer cannot shield itself from a bad faith charge
with a doctor's report based upon incomplete information.
b. Misrepresentation and Other Pre-Adjudicatory Practices
In addition to the duty to investigate, the insurer has certain obligations under
law regarding the sale, modification, and termination of a nonliability policy. Some
of these duties may be recited in the insurance contract. These duties become relevant
when the insurer refuses to pay based upon its belief that the plaintiff is not insured or
is not covered for the injury in question. If the insurer's behavior in these matters is
tainted with fraud or misrepresentation regarding policy coverage, the court may
impose punitive damages to punish the wrongful actor.
Furthermore, "[t]o avoid [first party] liability, an insurance company must
refrain from any violation of the supracontractual duties which the law has heretofore
recognized or seems likely to recognize in the near future."117 The California courts
sanction misrepresentations relied upon in purchasing the policy, if the insurer has no
intention of performing,li8 and misrepresentations made in attempting to dissuade the
insured from terminating his or her coverage.1 9 In Ohio, supracontractual duties are
set forth in the Unfair and Deceptive Practices section of the Insurance statute, 120 the
violation of which in the future may be held to constitute a tort.121 The primary thrust
113. National Sav. Life Ins. v. Dutton, 419 So. 2d 1357 (Ala. 1982).
114. Egan v. Mutual of Omaha Ins. Co., 63 Cal. App. 3d 659, 676-77, 133 Cal. Rptr. 899, 910 (1976).
115. 67 Cal. App. 3d 451, 136 Cal. Rptr. 653 (1977).
116. Id. at 462, 136 Cal. Rptr. at 659.
117. Langdon & Sytsma, The Duty of Good Faith and Fair Dealing and The Pre-Adjudicatory Role of The
Insurance Company Advocate, 45 INS. COUNSEL J. 309, 311 (1978).
118. Miller v. National Am. Life Ins. Co., 54 Cal. App. 3d 331, 338, 126 Cal. Rptr. 731, 734 (1976).
119. Wetherbee v. United Ins. Co. of Am., 265 Cal. App. 2d 921, 71 Cal. Rptr. 764 (1968). The manager sent a
letter to the insured who was dissatisfied with the policy because she believed "it could be cancelled at the whim of
defendant." This letter assured plaintiff that "' [a]ccording to the provisions of your policy, when you are sick or hurt you
will draw benefits as long as you live. Your policy cannot be terminated ... when you are permanently disabled."' Id.
at 925, 71 Cal. Rptr. at 766.
120. Onto REv. CoDE ANN. § 3901.21 (Page Supp. 1983).
121. Poindexter v. Willis, 23 Ohio Misc. 199, 208 (C.P. 1970) ("[Whenever the law creates a duty, the breach of
such duty coupled with consequent damage will be a tort also. This applies not only to the common law but also such
rights and duties as may be created by statute.").
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of the statute is the prohibition of any misrepresentation of "the terms of any policy
issued . . . or the benefits or advantages promised thereby or the dividends or share
of the surplus received thereon" '12 2 in trying to sell a policy. The statute also forbids
any misrepresentation made to the insured "for the purpose of inducing or tending to
induce [an insured] to . . .forfeit, change, or surrender insurance." 12 3 The insurer
also cannot attempt to change a policy by telling the insured that a change is man-
dated by the Act, 124 or to convince the insured not to make a claim by making an
incomplete comparison to the fact pattern of other claims that were disallowed. 125
c. The Duty to Inform
"One important facet of the insurer's obligation . . . is the duty reasonably to
inform an insured of the insured's rights and obligations under the insurance
policy"' 126 and those under law. The Supreme Court of California said:
[iun particular, in situations in which an insured's lack of knowledge may potentially
result in a loss of benefits or a forfeiture of rights, an insurer has been required to bring to
the insured's attention relevant information so as to enable the insured to take action to
secure rights afforded by the policy. 127
For example, an insurer has the duty to inform the insured whose employee's life
insurance policy coverage ended with the termination of his employment that the
policy afforded the terminated employee a grace period or option period in which he
could convert the policy into an individual policy and retain coverage. 128
The duty to inform the insured of an arbitration clause deserves special attention.
Arbitration is of great interest to the insured, the insurer, and to society in general
because it often provides "a speedy, economic and inexpensive dispute-resolution
process."-129 The California Supreme Court has held the insurer's failure to inform
the insureds of the arbitration procedure constitutes a breach of the insurer's duty of
good faith and fair dealing.130 The court reasoned that the insurer knew
that in many instances its insureds would not be aware of the arbitration clause and that,
despite this knowledge, [the insurer] deliberately decided not to inform its insureds of the
arbitration procedure. In this context, the practical effect of the insurer's practice was to
transform its arbitration into a unilateral provision, establishing a procedure to which the
insurer could require insureds to resort when [the insurer] deemed it advisable, but one
that would not generally [be employed quickly] by the bulk of [the insurer's] uninformed
insureds.1
3 t
122. Oato REv. CODE ANN. § 3901.21(A) (Page Supp. 1983).
123. Id. § 3901.21(J).
124. Id.
125. Id. § 3901.21(A).
126. Davis v. Blue Cross of N. Cal., 25 Cal. 3d 418, 428, 600 P.2d 1060, 1065, 158 Cal. Rptr. 828, 833 (1979).
127. Id. at 428, 600 P.2d at 1065-66, 158 Cal. Rptr. at 833-34.
128. Walker v. Occidental Life Ins. Co., 67 Cal. 2d 518, 432 P.2d 741, 63 Cal. Rptr. 45 (1967) (insurer also has
implied duty to notify the insured of the date on which the option period began to run).
129. Davis v. Blue Cross of N. Cal., 25 Cal. 3d 418,429, 600 P.2d 1060, 1066, 158 Cal. Rptr. 828, 834 (1979).
130. Id. at 430, 600 P.2d at 1067, 158 Cal. Rptr. at 835 (the insurer who failed to pay, forcing the insureds to litigate
the matter, forfeited any right subsequently to compel its insureds to submit their disputes to arbitration).
131. Id.
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In light of the rule concerning arbitration, in California the insurer has the duty to
inform the insured of any right under the contract of which the insured is likely to be
unaware.
3. The Role of Counsel
In failure to pay actions, the largest segment of an extra-contractual damages
judgment against the insurer may be comprised of punitive damages. 132 Therefore,
the primary concern of plaintiffs' counsel is laying the groundwork for such recovery.
The defense counsel, on the other hand, should endeavor to vanquish the claim for
punitive damages before the issue reaches the jury,' 3 3 or to create conditions con-
ducive to minimizing such damages.
Regardless of the theory or theories pursued, it is essential that a plaintiff should
specifically demand relief in the form of punitive damages, even though such a
demand may not be required under the rules of procedure. 134 Although actual malice,
a prerequisite to recovery of punitive damages in Ohio, may be averred generally,135
averments of fraud in cases in which misrepresentations by the insurer induced the
insured to purchase, maintain, or surrender coverage, must be stated "with
particularity."-1 36 Failure to do so will subject the claim to a motion to dismiss 37 or at
least a motion for a more definite statement. ' 38 Plaintiffs who predicate their claim
for punitive damages upon the theory of intentional infliction of emotional distress, as
is required in Wisconsin, must specifically aver that the defendant's behavior con-
stituted extreme and outrageous conduct that caused both emotional injury and sub-
stantial pecuniary lOSS. 13
9
Although a defense attorney may be able to attack successfully a complaint
using a motion to dismiss or a motion for a more definite statement, "the chances of
successfully obviating a punitive claim may be enhanced by deferring the attack until
most of the discovery is completed, and the facts on which the punitive claim is fairly
well established by depositions and interrogatories, so that a summary judgment
motion may be made." 140 Another defense tactic that may minimize the impact of a
claim for extra-contractual damages is the removal of the suit to a federal court. In
some instances the federal forum will provide a more conservative and insurance
company oriented jury and a requirement of jury unanimity, which may not be
required in the state court. 141 Also, if the case is appealed, the defense avoids the risk
of encountering the judge or judges who first recognized the right to recover extra-
132. See, e.g., Fellows v. Allstate Ins. Co., No. C259993 (C.D. Super. Ct. Cal. 1983) (jury awarded $40.5 million
upon failure to pay a $36,000 claim).
133. Komblum, supra note 87, at 543.
134. FED. R. Civ. P. 8(a)(3).
135. FED. R. civ. P. 9(b).
136. Id.
137. FED. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(6); see, e.g., Shapiro v. Miami Oil Producers, Inc., 84 F.R.D. 234, 236-39 (D. Mass.
1979).
138. FED. R. Civ. P. 12(e).
139. Anderson v. Continental Ins. Co., 85 Wis. 2d 675, 694-95, 271 N.W.2d 368, 378 (1978).
140. Komblum, supra note 87, at 543.
141. Id. at 541.
[Vol. 46:157
FROM GOOD FAITH TO STRICT LIABILITY
contractual damages in that state's first party actions and who may be disposed to
expand the right of recovery in these cases. Federal judges in diversity cases are
bound by state law precedent and, thus, usually cannot expand current doctrines. 
4 2
A plaintiff may frustrate defense counsel's efforts to remove by joining local com-
pany personnel in the action to destroy diversity jurisdiction if plaintiff can allege that
these employees acted tortiously towards plaintiff. However, "[i]f defense counsel
can show that no claim can be stated against these defendants and that their joinder
was for the ulterior motive of preventing removal, the case may be removed and an
effort to remand successfully resisted."' 43
In addition to properly pleading punitive damage claims, the insured's counsel
should correctly and completely aver its claim for compensatory damages flowing
from the insurance policy itself. Although future policy benefits are not recoverable
under a contractual cause of action for failure to pay,144 they may be recovered in a
valid tort cause of action for the breach of the implied covenant of good faith and fair
dealing. In Pistorious v. Prudential Insurance Co. of America,145 the plaintiff pre-
vailed on its demand for $17,000 in future policy benefits under a disability insurance
policy, this amount constituting the "present cash value of future policy benefits." 4 6
All defendants likewise should seek to reduce any judgment for future policy benefits
to present cash value, and plaintiffs counsel should be especially sensitive to poten-
tial policy benefits, which may be recovered in permanent and total disability
cases. 1
47
In the discovery stage of a first party failure to pay action, plaintiff's counsel
must secure information that will demonstrate the insurer's bad faith in handling the
insured's claim, and defense counsel has the responsibility of protecting privileged or
irrelevant information from being discovered. For example, the plaintiff's attorney
should be sensitive to all information pertaining to the company's method of record-
ing pertinent data. In Egan v. Mutual of Omaha,148 the plaintiff's attorney was able to
trace a supposedly low level error in the handling of the claim to persons of greater
authority when he learned of the company's recording method. In that case the
insurer routinely recorded the route that the file traveled through the firm onto a
special file jacket, which the insurer had failed to produce along with the file itself.
The plaintiffs counsel was able to establish high level bad faith when he secured this
file jacket. 149
Also, the plaintiffs counsel has a responsibility to oversee closely the insurer's
utilization of an independent medical examination in assessing the validity of a claim
142. See Erie R.R. Co. v. Tompkins, 304 U.S. 64 (1938).
143. Komblum, supra note 87, at 541-42.
144. Erreca v. Western States Life Ins. Co., 19 Cal. 2d 388, 402, 121 P.2d 689, 695 (1942).
145. 123 Cal. App. 3d 541, 176 Cal. Rptr. 660 (1981).
146. Id. at 550 n.6, 176 Cal. Rptr. at 665 n.6.
147. At trial, plaintiff's attorney may wish to use attorneys and independent claims personnel as expert witnesses to
testify on a wide variety of subjects. Such experts may testify about the reasonable settlement value of a claim, insurance
industry standards, or even about the ultimate issue of whether the insurer acted in bad faith. Groce v. Fidelity Gen. Ins.
Co., 252 Or. 296, 448 P.2d 554 (1968); see also Komblum, supra note 18, at 186-88. For insurance industry standards,
see Miller v. Los Angeles County Flood Control Dist., 8 Cal. 3d 689, 505 P.2d 193, 106 Cal. Rptr. 1 (1973).
148. 63 Cal. App. 3d 659, 133 Cal. Rptr. 899 (1976).
149. For an interesting rendition of the facts, see TOBIAS, THE INvismLE BANKER 134-35 (1982).
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of injury or other physical disability or in attempting to avoid charges of insufficient
investigation. "The validity and strength of an independent medical examination
report will to a large extent depend on the information made available to the doctor
conducting the independent medical examination."' 150 Thus, the plaintiff should
discover all medical records pertaining to the insured that were in the possession of
the insurer at the time of the examination to determine whether the insurer made full
disclosure of the records to the independent doctor. Failure to provide the doctor with
all pertinent medical records may constitute outrageous conduct sufficient to support
a cause of action for breach of the duty of good faith and fair dealing, fraud, or the
intentional infliction of severe emotional distress. 5 ' Also, "plaintiffs attorney
should investigate whether the doctor conducting the independent medical examina-
tion has been selected by the insurer because the doctor has a long history of con-
sistently supporting the insurer's position with regard to the denial of insurance
benefit claims." 1 52 Evidence that the doctor is a so-called hired gun may be particu-
larly damaging to the defense at trial.
Since the plaintiff greatly needs to obtain information possessed by the insured,
an important role of the defense attorney during the discovery stage is that of overseer
of the release of information.
Whether documents such as claim files and company manuals are discoverable usually
depends on the local rules. Before they are produced, they should be screened to prevent
discovery of portions of the claim file that may be privileged because they are com-
munications between records of transactions involving corporate counsel and company
personnel, or because they reflect the contents of communications between trial and
corporate counsel. In addition, any manuals outlining company procedures or policies
should be reviewed prior to disclosure so that only those relevant to the lawsuit for
discovery purposes are disclosed.' 5 3
To avoid charges of not disclosing properly discoverable documents, "counsel
should keep a careful record of documents produced, as well as those not disclosed
because of objection,' ' 154 and also should record the objection relied upon.
The defense counsel probably will wish to engage in at least the following
discovery: Primarily, the defendant will seek to expose the plaintiff's version of what
transpired between the insured and the insurance company's claims personnel, and, if
plaintiff alleges fraudulent inducement, between the insured and the sales agent.
Defendant also will want to determine the type and extent of damages claimed. With
this in mind, "it is advantageous to take the plaintiff's deposition at an early stage,
whether he or she is the insured on a health or accident policy or a beneficiary under a
life policy." 155 Another potential source of information is the plaintiff's attorney. In




153. Kornblum, supra note 87, at 547.
154. Id.
155. Id. at 559.
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Fireman's Fund Insurance Co. v. Superior Court of Los Angeles, 156 the court
allowed defense counsel to inquire at deposition whether plaintiff's attorney fur-
nished all of the medical information available to examining doctors or to the insurer
itself. 157 The California Court of Appeal held in this case that "in those cases . . . in
which bad faith is alleged and punitive damages are sought based upon that allegation
of bad faith .... we think the facts fall outside attorney-client privilege, and outside
the work product rule, and the deposition of the attorney may be taken, subject to all
proper objections."' 58 The attorney's deposition may reveal how plaintiff's counsel
handled information or if counsel provided the insurer with the opportunity to settle
the claim for benefits in a good faith manner. As a practical matter, the deposition of
an opposing attorney may be of somewhat limited utility because the attorney not
only is likely to invoke the attorney-client privilege, but also is apt to be recalcitrant
and well-versed in avoiding release of legally damaging information.
Finally, the defense attorney's preadjudicatory role can prevent the insurer's
exposure to liability for bad faith altogether. The insurer's counsel should begin by
recommending that the insurer use great care in the selection of sales agents and
claims personnel. 159 "The old objective of the claims man 'to find the loophole' is at
an end." 160 Insurance company counsel should advocate "the adoption of procedures
whereby all [sales agents and claims adjusters] are fully acquainted with the various
prohibitions contained in the Unfair Trade Practices Act. [The companies] should
also adopt procedures for checking on the performance of claims adjustment per-
sonnel in light of the said prohibitions." 61 The procedures adopted by the insurer
should be reduced to writing and be applied uniformly because "the existence of
formalized procedures governing fair claim settlement practices could easily bolster a
good faith defense. ' 162
4. The Need for a New Standard
First party actions have successfully attacked some abuses perpetrated by in-
surance companies in handling nonliability policy claims. "The successful prosecu-
tion of such a case also helps bring abuses to the attention of the public, legislatures,
and the courts, thereby destroying the climate within which such abuses thrive." 63
Arguably, insurers will be encouraged to act in good faith because they will not want
to pay large extra-contractual damage awards. The shareholders of insurance com-
panies will pursue the firm's management personnel to avoid this drain upon their
156. 72 Cal. App. 3d 786, 140 Cal. Rptr. 677 (1977).
157. Id. at 789, 140 Cal. Rptr. at 679.
158. Id. at 790, 140 Cal. Rptr. at 679-80.
159. Langdon & Sytsrna, supra note 117, at 313.
160. Dillard, The Bomb Fell on California-Punitive Damages, 22 AMERICAN LIE INSURANCE COUNSEL PRO-
CEEDINGS 965, 986 (1973).
161. Langdon & Sytsma, supra note 117, at 315. Ohio's unfair and deceptive practices statute pertaining to
insurance is codified in OHio REv. CODE ANN. § 3901.21 (Page Supp. 1983).
162. Langdon & Sytsma, supra note 117, at 315.
163. Shemoff & Blickenstaff, supra note 150, at 141.
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profit margin. 164 Also, the denunciation effect of adverse judgments will drive away
insurance purchasers, and further strain the profit margin. Plaintiffs' attorneys have
found these cases to be an "excellent opportunity to participate in the definition of the
reasonable scope of insurance investigations."- 165 Similarly, vigorous work by de-
fense counsel has narrowed the parameters of the recovery in failure to pay cases. For
example, in Twentieth Century-Fox Film Corp. v. Harbor Insurance Co., 16 6 the
defense successfully persuaded the California Court of Appeal that the federal bad
faith rule allowing plaintiffs to recover attorneys' fees in addition to punitive damages
should not be adopted in that state.' 67 In light of the large attorneys' fees often
expended in pursuit of bad faith cases,' 68 this precedent has been extremely bene-
ficial to California insurers. Other defense arguments have been less successful; an
Oklahoma attorney recently contended that "[t]he judicially created classification of
insurance contract cases allowing punitive damages in those cases while all other
contract cases preclude punitive damages is a violation of the equal protection and
due process clauses of the United States and Oklahoma Constitutions."' 69 The Okla-
homa courts, nonetheless, continue to recognize the action.
However, establishing bad faith is a time consuming and expensive process. In
addition, the variety of theories and standards employed by the courts encourages
forum shopping. 170 Also, the very nature of bad faith, which involves some sort of
consciousness of wrongdoing, is difficult to apply to an insurance company made up
of many individuals operating in different capacities. Often the denial of payment is
based upon a tacit agreement between the company's personnel to do so.17 1 These
factors favor a strict liability approach so that the insured whose valid claim is denied
can seek redress without the difficult burden of establishing bad faith.
III. THE STRICT LIABILITY APPROACH
A. Introduction
Strict liability refers to the imposition of liability for injury without a showing of
fault or negligence.172 The theory has been applied in a variety of circumstances,
including liability for harm caused by wild animals, 173 escaped water,' 74 and de-
164. Note, supra note 4, at 605.
165. Shemoff & Blickenstaff, supra note 150, at 141.
166. 85 Cal. App. 3d 105, 149 Cal. Rptr. 313 (1978).
167. However, an insured may recover attorneys' fees expended during negotiations engendered by insurer's
conduct. Mustachio v. Ohio Farmers Ins. Co., 44 Cal. App. 3d 358, 363-64, 118 Cal. Rptr. 581, 584-85 (1975). For an
argument favoring recovery of attorneys' fees in bad faith failure to pay actions, see Note, Attorney's Fee Recovery in Bad
Faith Cases: New Directions for Change, 57 S. CAL. L. REv. 503, 522-30 (1984).
168. In Harbor Insurance, for example, the plaintiff sued for $43,000 in attorney's fees.
169. Woodard, Punitive Damages For Bad Faith Breach of an Insurance Contract: It's Unconstitutional, 54 OKLA.
B.J. 1125, 1125 (1983).
170. Cf. supra text accompanying notes 97-98.
171. Cf. Egan v. Mutual of Omaha Ins. Co., 63 Cal. App. 3d 659, 133 Cal. Rptr. 899 (1976).
172. BLAcK's LAW DICTIONARY 9 (5th ed. 1979).
173. See McNeely, A Footnote on Dangerous Animals, 37 Mtcn. L. REv. 1181 (1939).
174. See, e.g., Filtrol Corp. v. Hughes, 199 Miss. 10, 23 So. 2d 891 (1945) (water collected in an inappropriate
place); City of Barberton v. Miksch, 128 Ohio St. 169, 190 N.E. 387 (1934) (water allowed to percolate); cf. Stevens-Salt
Lake City v. Wong, 123 Utah 309, 259 P.2d 586 (1953) (escaped water from household pipes).
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fectively built or packaged products. 175 It has even been employed in a criminal
context for the imposition of guilt for the commission of an act without any showing
of intent. 176 In tort cases, the strict liability theory has been confined to things or
activities that are extraordinary or exceptional; "[t]here must be 'some special use'
bringing with it increased danger to others." 177 For example, storers of dynamite
have been held strictly liable for damages inflicted upon people from an explosion,
not caused by the storer's illegal storage or negligence, "upon the ground that the use
of dynamite is so dangerous that it ought to be at the owners' risk." 178 Perhaps the
best known strict liability cases deal with the imposition of the doctrine against
manufacturers or bottlers of soft drinks 179 or beer' 80 bottles that unexpectedly ex-
plode. In Escola v. Coca-Cola Bottling Co. of Fresno,18 1 Justice Traynor, in a
concurring opinion articulated the explanation for the doctrine of strict liability in
tort:
Even if there is no negligence ... public policy demands that responsibility be fixed
wherever it will most effectively reduce the hazards to life and health inherent in defective
products that reach the market. It is evident that the manufacturer can anticipate some
hazards and guard against the recurrence of others, as the public cannot. Those who suffer
injury from defective products are unprepared to meet its consequences. The cost of an
injury and the loss of time or health may be an overwhelming misfortune to the person
injured, and a needless one, for the risk of injury can be insured by the manufacturer and
distributed among the public as a cost of doing business.
182
This Comment proposes that the Ohio Supreme Court adopt a strict liability
approach for both third party failure to settle cases and first party failure to pay cases.
In both settings, such an approach would mean that the plaintiff no longer would have
to prove bad faith on the part of the insurance company in order to establish a prima
facie case.
Under this proposal, if a liability insurer refuses to accept an offer of settlement
from an injured third party at or below the policy limit and at trial the third party
secures a judgment in excess of the policy limit, the insurer would be liable for the
entire judgment. Even though the insurer's contractual duty under the policy only
extends to the policy limit, the excess amount could be recovered by the insured'83 as
extra-contractual damages. In effect such a rule would serve as a warning to in-
surance companies: If they wish to refuse an offer of settlement within the policy
limit and gamble that they may escape from liability altogether, they will have to
gamble with their own money, not the money of the insured. In establishing a case
against the insurer for the excess damages plaintiff must prove that the injured third
party made an offer of settlement within the policy limit that was rejected by the
175. W. PRossER, supra note 85, at 656-58.
176. KADISH, SCHULHOFER, & PAULSON, CRIMINAL LAW AND ITS PROCESS 323-39 (1983).
177. W. PRossER, supra note 85, at 506 (interpreting English law); see also REsrATE.tEwT (SECOND) OF TORTS
§ 520(b) (1976).
178. Exner v. Sherman Power Constr. Co., 54 F.2d 510, 513 (2d Cir. 1931).
179. Barbeau v. Roddy Mfg. Corp., 431 F.2d 989 (6th Cir. 1970).
180. Falstaff Brewing Co. v. Williams, 234 So. 2d 620 (Miss. 1970).
181. 24 Cal. 2d 453, 150 P.2d 436 (1944).
182. Id. at 462, 150 P.2d at 440-41.
183. See infra section In1B.
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insurer. If the plaintiff, after being properly notified of a settlement'offer, told the
negotiating insurance company not to accept the settlement offer, the refusal to accept
would operate as a waiver, and the insurance company could use the waiver as a
defense.
In the first party setting, if the nonliability insurer refused to pay a valid claim
properly and the insured suffered further damages as a result of the insurer's refusal to
pay, then the insurer would be liable for the damages caused in excess of the amount
of the valid claim. This recovery is another form of extra-contractual damages, 184 and
as such may exceed the policy limit. Under this rule the Hoskins1 85 case would come
out differently; because of the insurer's failure to investigate thoroughly, the plain-
tiffs in Hoskins suffered injury that should be remedied. This rule is not one of
absolute liability, however. 18 6 The plaintiff still would have to show that the original
claim was valid, that the insurer failed to pay within a reasonable time, that the
plaintiff suffered injury, and that the injury was caused by insurer's failure to pay. As
in the proposed third party rule, proof of actual malice would not be a prerequisite to
recovery in excess of policy limits. The proposed first party rule also would serve as a
warning to insurance companies: because they promise to protect the insured and the
insured relies on this promise, the insurer must pay valid claims promptly. If the
insurer wishes to gamble that a trier of fact will find the claim invalid and loses, the
insurer must pay not only for the claim but also must pay extra-contractual damages
for its conduct.
The size of the insurance industry in the United States is staggering;' 8 7 Amer-
icans pay $500 billion in premiums each year according to one estimate. ' 88 Yet the
insurance industry is poorly regulated by statute, especially at the federal level,
189
and only the federal judiciary has controlled the industry with any success. 190 In
contrast, the individual insured, who usually cannot match the sheer economic
strength of the insurance company in the first place, is often in a worse financial
position as a result of the "death, sickness, disability, or other misfortune"' 9 ' that
has given rise to the claim. The insured or beneficiary may have lost its sole source of
income, making it impossible to meet other financial obligations.
Against this backdrop, the strict liability approach has great appeal as a method
of risk apportionment. The insurer is better able to shoulder the risk of an adverse
judgment in the third party setting and the risk that the claim may not be covered in
the first party case. Insurance is by definition a risk spreading institution; it is a
method by which society as a whole shares the burden of the individual's loss. The
concept of strict liability is consistent with this ideal; in the case of the dynamite
184. See id.
185. See supra text accompanying notes 78-86.
186. Absolute liability, as used here, would mean that insurers would be liable for all claims they refused to pay,
whether or not the claims were valid.
187. Approximately 1,895,000 Americans are employed by the insurance industry. TOBIAS, supra note 149, at 1.
188. Id. at 13.
189. Id. at 8.
190. Id. at 9.
191. Comment, The Emerging Fiduciary Obligations and Strict Liability in Insurance Law, 14 CAL. W.L. REv.
358, 376 (1978).
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storer, for example, the storer has been characterized as an insurer against loss
suffered within the community it operates. 192
Although the imposition of strict liability envisions that the insurance company
will be colossal, the rule is not unduly harsh on the smaller insurer. One of the
considerations in the assessment of punitive damages is the wealth of the de-
fendant.' 93 Therefore, the smaller insurer is protected from excessive punitive
awards.
B. Fiduciaries and Fairness
In the third party context, the insurer acts as the insured's fiduciary in attempting
to settle the claim. This fact alone should be sufficient to force the insurer to place the
interests of the insured ahead of its own, although some courts have not so held. 194 In
Rova Farms Resort, Inc. v. Investors Insurance Co., 95 the New Jersey Supreme
Court advocated the implementation of a strict liability standard, commenting that
"there is more than a small amount of elementary justice in a rule that would require
that in this situation where the insurer's and insured's interests necessarily conflict,
the insurer, which may reap the benefits of its determination not to settle, should also
suffer the detriments of its decision."' 196 The insurer that decided to gamble and
reject a settlement offer at or below policy limits would do so at its own risk. The
Rova court also pointed out that the standard would be an easy one to apply; 197
establishing a case against the insurer would be far less expensive and time consum-
ing for the insured.
Some proponents of the imposition of strict liability in third party cases believe
that the approach would be inappropriate in the first party setting because it "would
abrogate the insurer's right to investigate and reject invalid claims."' 98 This argu-
ment neglects the fact that under a strict liability approach, the insurer's ability to
refuse payment of illegitimate claims remains undiminished. A prerequisite to the
recovery of extra-contractual damages is a legitimate claim for policy benefits. If the
plaintiff cannot convince the jury that the insurance company breached the insurance
contract, the jury will be precluded from considering bad faith in the insurer's in-
vestigation or refusal to pay the claim and will not even reach the issue of extra-
contractual damages. The argument against strict liability suggests that under this
approach, the insurer will be forced to pay huge punitive damages on many spurious
claims. This simply is not the case. The practical effect of the rule would be to
encourage more thorough investigation by the insurer. The insurer would not merely
perform a perfunctory investigation to avoid a charge of bad faith, but would in-
vestigate in earnest to determine the merits of the claim in order to make an informed
192. Exner v. Sherman Power Constr. Co., 54 F.2d 510, 512 (2d Cir. 1931).
193. RESTATEMiENT (SECOND) OF ToRTs § 908(2) (1977).
194. See supra text accompanying notes 41-42.
195. 65 N.J. 474, 323 A.2d 495 (1974).
196. Id. at 502, 323 A.2d at 510 (quoting Crisci v. Security Ins. Co., 66 Cal. 2d 425, 431,426 P.2d 173, 177, 58
Cal. Rptr. 13, 17 (1967)).
197. Id.
198. Note, supra note 4, at 596.
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decision whether the claim was valid. Considering the insurer's resources and the
claims assessment expertise, 199 such a burden would be equitable.
C. Damages
Extra-contractual damages in the insurance setting may include compensatory
damages for pecuniary loss and for emotional distress, even if such damages could
not have been forseen when the insured bought the policy. Thus, such damages may
exceed consequential damages awarded in contract actions. Extra-contractual dam-
ages are sometimes referred to as punitive damages, although in fact the two are not
synonymous. Punitive damages are one type of extra-contractual damages. In the
third party setting, extra-contractual damages should equal the size of the judgment
that arose from the insurer's refusal to settle. In the first party setting, the award
should fully compensate the insured for injuries sustained as a result of the insurer's
failure to pay. To fully remedy harm to the insured, a liberal standard, allowing
recovery for all financial injury and emotional distress, should be adopted.
Traditional punitive damages, damages imposed solely to punish the defendant,
also should be available to plaintiffs in these actions. Failure to pay or settle valid
claims is a violation of public policy attempting to equalize bargaining power be-
tween insurer and insured and should be deterred by imposing heavy sanctions on
wrongdoers. The actual malice standard currently in force in Ohio, thus, is only
appropriate in deciding whether the insurer should be punished beyond the damages
assessed for the insured's financial outlay and emotional distress.
D. Conclusion
As emphasized by the court in McDowell v. Union Mutual Life Insurance
Co.,2°° the case that most closely resembles a strict liability approach in first party
actions, "[t]he risks flowing from error must be placed on the insurance company,
not the insured. California has learned that contrary rules place disproportionate
bargaining power in the hands of the insurance companies and permit them to compel
the acceptance of unreasonable settlements." 20 1 Strict liability would strike a better
balance between the insurer and the insured. The good faith rules in effect today go a
long way towards protecting the rights of the insured. However, the standard allows
many pecuniary and emotional injuries suffered by the insured due to the insurer's
miscalculations to go without redress. Since the insured's financial status may be
worsened by a failure to pay and will certainly be worsened by a failure to settle and
because the insured's emotional distress caused by the injury or accident is likely to
be exacerbated, a more stringent rule is needed.
The liability insurer that refuses to accept an offer of compromise at or below
policy limits without the insured's consent should be liable for the entire judgment
against the insured, including amounts in excess of the policy limits. Similarly, the
199. Comment, supra note 19, at 380-81.
200. 404 F. Supp. 136 (C.D. Cal. 1975).
201. Id. at 141.
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nonliability insurer that refuses to pay a valid claim should be liable for the pecuniary
damage and severe emotional distress caused by the failure to pay. Local rules may
require that emotional distress always be accompanied by contemporaneous physical
harm, but in any event, the recovery should not be predicated upon a showing of bad
faith.
The bad faith standard has proven to be a difficult and confusing one to apply,
and has failed to give the insured the protection expected under an insurance policy.
Adoption of a strict liability standard is the logical and fair step beyond the good faith
standard.
David Pomerantz

